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Abstract
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 18021 “Symmetric
Cryptography”, which was held on January 7–12, 2018 in Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center
for Informatics. The seminar was the sixth in a series of Dagstuhl seminars on “Symmetric
Cryptography”, previously held in 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2016.
During the seminar, many of the participants presented their current research in the design,
analysis, and application of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, including ongoing work and
open problems. This report documents the abstracts or extended abstracts of the talks presented
during the seminar, as well as summaries of the discussion sessions.
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IT Security plays an increasingly vital role in everyday life and business. When talking on
a mobile phone, when withdrawing money from an ATM or when buying goods over the
internet, security plays a crucial role in both protecting the user and in maintaining public
confidence in the system. Especially after the disclosure of the NSA’s world-spanning spying
activities and in the context of the Internet of Things, IT Security and privacy protection
is a vital topic of the 21st century. In the Internet of Things (IoT) era, everything will be
connected. Intel estimates that 200 billion objects will be connected by 2020. The objects
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include for instance smart devices for healthcare, industrial control systems, automotive, and
smart homes. Virtually all modern security solutions rely on cryptography.
Symmetric cryptography deals with the case that both the sender and the receiver of
a message are using the same key. This differentiates symmetric cryptography from its
asymmetric counterpart, where senders or verifiers use a “public key” and receivers or signers
use a corresponding but different “private key”. As asymmetric primitives are typically orders
of magnitude less efficient than symmetric cryptographic schemes, symmetric cryptosystems
remain the main workhorses of cryptography and highly relevant not only for academia, but
also for industrial research and applications. While great progress has been made in designing
and analyzing ciphers, fundamental aspects of these ciphers are still not fully understood.
Moreover, as we have learned from the Snowden revelations, cryptography in general and
symmetric cryptography in particular faces new fascinating challenges.
Current Topics and Challenges
We identified the following three areas as among the most important topics for future research.
Cryptography for the IoT. Motivated by the upcoming IoT, one of the strong research
trends in symmetric cryptography is about lightweight cryptography. Here, lightweight
cryptography refers to strong cryptography, that can be executed on heavily resource
constrained devices. Those efforts resulted in a wide variety of block cipher designs suitable
for IoT applications. For instance, PRESENT designed in 2007 is one of the early designs
with strong implementation advantages on hardware, and there have been other innovative
follow-up block cipher designs. Some of them are standardized as the international standard,
and used in thousands of devices in our daily lives. However, a block cipher is not the
solution to all cryptographic purposes. For instance, to encrypt a certain amount of data,
the block cipher has to be integrated into a suitable mode of operation. In most practical
use cases, confidentiality is not the only concern, as many scenarios require data authenticity
as well. Here a message authentication code (MAC) can be used to ensure authenticity.
Authenticated encryption (AE) is used for protecting both confidentiality and authenticity.
The first MAC, called Chaskey, that specifically targets applications for lightweight
cryptography was proposed only recently in 2014. The CAESAR project, an international
competition for AE initiated at Dagstuhl, attracted several submissions that were designed
for the purposes for lightweight cryptography. There is also a recent attempt to design
a lightweight tweakable block cipher, an advanced primitive of a block cipher that allows
more flexible usage, which can be efficiently integrated into highly secure encryption and/or
authentication mechanisms. However, this research just started and many primitives and
modes of operations suitable for lightweight crypto remain to be explored.
Statistical Attacks. Statistical attacks have been deployed widely and providing strong
resistance against them has resulted in several important design criteria for contemporary
symmetric primitives. The first type of statistical attacks that is applicable to a large set
of block ciphers is differential cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir. Since its
invention in the early nineties several variants, tweaks and generalizations have been proposed
and applied to many block ciphers. The second generally applicable attack on block ciphers
is Matsui’s linear cryptanalysis. Similarly to differential attacks, since its introduction,
many extensions and improvements have been made. One main issue that has become
apparent only recently is the accuracy of the underlying statistical models that researchers
are using. Typically, those models are presented under some simplifying assumptions, whose
validity remains an open question. It is an important challenge to settle these unsatisfactory
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simplifications. This becomes even more important when the attacks are hard or impossible
to verify experimentally due to the large computational costs involved. Moreover, to allow
comparison between different attacks the researchers must agree on common attack models
and parameters that measure the performance of the attack.
Symmetric Cryptography and Real-World Needs. The symmetric cryptography com-
munity has many very talented people and the state of the area has moved from it infancy in
the seventies to a mature field today. However, we should ensure that the world’s population
does benefit of this progress. In particular, the Snowden leaks have painfully illustrated
that citizen privacy and anonymity is next to non-existent nowadays. Secret services and IT
corporations massively spy on people’s communication and data storage for motives such as
profit and surveillance. They don’t seem to be hindered significantly in this at all by the
pervasive deployment of cryptography (TLS, GSM, WPA, etc.). Cynically, monopolistic
corporations like Google use encryption to protect the data of their users from prying eyes of
other players such as network providers. It appears that much of the cryptography deployed
today is there to protect the powers that be rather than protect human rights. With the
roll-out of smart grid and internet-of-things surveillance will become quasi universal with all
imaginable devices reporting on our behavior to big corporations. This situation has been
addressed in several invited talks by Bart Preneel and Adi Shamir and they rightfully say
that we as a cryptographic community should attempt to improve this. Along the same lines,
Phil Rogaway gave a highly acclaimed invited talk at Asiacrypt 2015 on the moral aspects
on cryptographic research. He invites us to do some introspection and ask the question: are
we doing the right thing?
We believe these questions are important also for the symmetric crypto community. While
the problem is certainly not restricted to symmetric cryptography and probably cannot be
solved by symmetric cryptography alone, we should consider it our moral duty to improve
the situation.
Seminar Program
The seminar program consists of presentations about the above topics, and relevant areas of
symmetric cryptography, including new cryptanalytic techniques and new designs. Further-
more, there were discussion sessions. In “Discussion on CAESAR with focus on robustness”,
we discussed about the meaning and relevance of the term robustness in general and for
the CAESAR competition in particular. In “Discussion on Mass Surveillance”, a number
of questions related to the real-world relevance of the symmetric crypto community and its
research were discussed. For both discussions we provide summery of the questions and
results.
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3 Overview of Talks
3.1 TMD tradeoffs on small-state stream ciphers
Willi Meier (FH Nordwestschweiz – Windisch, CH)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Willi Meier
Design and analysis of stream ciphers whose state is smaller than double the key size
(small-state stream ciphers) is not fully exploited yet. For small-state stream ciphers that
continuously use the non-volatile key in the state update, a TMD-TO distinguisher is
described. A new mode for stream ciphers that continuously involve the IV (instead of the
key) is proposed. Arguments are provided that this mode can resist generic TMD-TOs.
3.2 Towards Low Energy Stream Ciphers
Vasily Mikhalev (Universität Mannheim, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Vasily Mikhalev
Joint work of Subhadeep Banik, Frederik Armknecht, Takanori Isobe, Willi Meier, Andrey Bogdanov, Yuhei
Watanabe, Francesco Regazzoni
Energy optimization is an important design aspect of lightweight cryptography. Since low
energy ciphers drain less battery, they are invaluable components of devices that operate on
a tight energy budget such as handheld devices or RFID tags. At Asiacrypt 2015, Banik
et. al. presented the block cipher family Midori which was designed to optimize the energy
consumed per encryption and which reduces the energy consumption by more than 30%
compared to previous block ciphers. However, if one has to encrypt/decrypt longer streams
of data, i.e. for bulk data encryption/decryption, it is expected that a stream cipher should
perform even better than block ciphers in terms of energy required to encrypt.
In this work, we address the question of designing low energy ciphers. To this end, we first
analyze for common stream cipher design components their impact on the energy consumption.
Based on this, we give arguments why indeed stream ciphers allow for encrypting long data
streams with less energy than block ciphers and validate our findings by implementations.
Afterwards, we use the analysis results to identify energy minimizing design principles for
stream ciphers.
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3.3 An LFSR-based Proof of Work
Frederik Armknecht (Universität Mannheim, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Frederik Armknecht
Joint work of Frederik Armknecht, Ludovic Barman, Jens-Matthias Bohli, Ghassan O. Karame
Main reference Frederik Armknecht, Ludovic Barman, Jens-Matthias Bohli, Ghassan O. Karame: “Mirror:
Enabling Proofs of Data Replication and Retrievability in the Cloud”, in Proc. of the 25th
USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 16, Austin, TX, USA, August 10-12, 2016.,
pp. 1051–1068, USENIX Association, 2016.
URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/armknecht
In this talk, we present a novel cryptographic mechanism that is based on LFSRs (linear
feedback shift register). It may be seen as a kind of proof of work in the following sense. The
task is to compute certain elements from a finite group that are determined by an LFSR.
The novel aspect here is that to this end, a short LFSR with small coefficients (over some
finite field larger than GF(2)) are used but these specifications are kept secret. Instead,
one publishes a related LFSR that is longer and has large coefficients. The aim of this
scheme is that a prover who knows only the public specifications has to invest a minimum
amount of effort to generate the elements while a verifier can use the knowledge of the secret
specifications for a much faster verification.
The scheme has been initially introduced by us at USENIX Security 2016 to realize a
scheme that allows for remote verification whether data has been stored with a sufficient
level of redundancy. We think however that the presented mechanism can be of independent
interest and poses some novel challenges, e.g., how to prove a minimum effort of the prover.
In this talk, we explain the mechanism into more detail and also tell security arguments why
a prover seem to have a higher computational effort than the verifier.
3.4 Rasta: Designing a cipher with low ANDdepth and few ANDs per
bit
Christoph Dobraunig (TU Graz, AT)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Christoph Dobraunig
Joint work of Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Lorenzo Grassi, Virginie Lallemand, Gregor Leander,
Florian Mendel, Christian Rechberger
Various lines of work have recently progressed with the investigation of the design and
analysis of symmetric cryptographic schemes that minimize multiplications in one way or
another. This has already led to unusual designs and interesting cryptanalytic insights. Even
when only considering the class of schemes whose circuit has a natural and simple description
in GF(2), there are various metrics that are interesting and useful: The total number of
AND gates, the number of AND gates per encrypted bit, or the depth of the AND gate part
of the circuit (ANDdepth), among others.
In this talk, we present with Rasta a design strategy for symmetric encryption that has
ANDdepth d and at the same time only needs d ANDs per encrypted bit. The main result is
that even for very low values of d between 2 and 6 we can give strong evidence that attacks
may not exist. This contributes to a better understanding of the limits of what concrete
symmetric-key constructions can theoretically achieve with respect to AND-related metrics.
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3.5 Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption
Stefan Lucks (Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Stefan Lucks
Practical cryptography often suffers from vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks. Two major
approaches to deal with this problem are physical and algorithmic countermeasures. Physical
countermeasures, such as “masking”, try to prevent the side-channel, or to narrow it down.
Algorithmic countermeasures are about meaningful security against adversaries with access
to a (limited) side-channel.
This talk is about algorithmic countermeasures, which have been initiated with high hopes
(Micali, Reyzin, 2004; Dziembowski, Pietrzak, 2008), but so far failed to take off in practice,
specifically in Symmetric Cryptography. This talk is about algorithmic countermeasures
and schemes which are supposed to be practically useful, while still maintaining a sound
theoretical security proof. The formal approach is the introduction of leaking queries for
(otherwise) ideal block ciphers.
3.6 Key Prediction Security of Keyed Sponges
Bart Mennink (Radboud University Nijmegen, NL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Bart Mennink
The keyed sponge is a well-accepted method for message authentication. It processes data at
a certain rate by sequential evaluation of an underlying permutation. If the key size k is
smaller than the rate, currently known bounds are tight, but if it exceeds the rate, state of the
art only dictates security up to 2k/2. We take closer inspection at the key prediction security
of the sponge and close the remaining gap in the existing security analysis: we confirm key
security up to close to 2k, regardless of the rate. The result impacts all applications of the
keyed sponge and duplex that process at a rate smaller than the key size, including the
STROBE protocol framework, as well as the related constructions such as HMAC-SHA-3
and the sandwich sponge.
3.7 Tree-searching for trail bounds
Gilles Van Assche (STMicroelectronics – Diegem, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Gilles Van Assche
Joint work of Silvia Mella, Joan Daemen, Gilles Van Assche
Main reference Silvia Mella, Joan Daemen, Gilles Van Assche: “New techniques for trail bounds and application to
differential trails in Keccak”, IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol., Vol. 2017(1), pp. 329–357, 2017.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.329-357
In this presentation, we present the advantages of using a unit-based tree search for bounding
the weight of differential and linear trails in cryptographic primitives. After recalling the
definitions as set out in [1], we motivate the technique for the generation and the extension
of differential and linear trails in the Keccak-f permutation. We then explain how the
technique can easily avoid generating states that are equivalent under symmetry properties,
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and how to use it to express trail extension when the states form an affine space. As an
additional application, we show the bounds obtained on the new Xoodoo permutation and
how the definition of units differed from those in Keccak-f . Finally, we conclude with
questions that guide the application of the technique to a given cryptographic primitive.
References
1 S. Mella, J. Daemen and G. Van Assche. New techniques for trail bounds and application
to differential trails in Keccak. IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol. 2017(1): 329-357 (2017)
3.8 Merkle Tree is not Optimal
Dmitry Khovratovich (University of Luxembourg, LU)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Dmitry Khovratovich
No abstract given.
3.9 Fast Correlation Attack Revisited
Yosuke Todo (NTT – Tokyo, JP)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Yosuke Todo
Joint work of Takanori Isobe, Willi Meier, Kazumaro Aoki, Bin Zhang
A fast correlation attack (FCA) is a well-known cryptanalysis technique for LFSR-based
stream ciphers. The correlation between the initial state of an LFSR and corresponding
key stream is exploited, and the goal is to recover the initial state of the LFSR. In this
talk we revisit the FCA from a new point of view based on a finite field, and it brings a
new property for the FCA when there are multiple linear approximations. Moreover we
propose a novel algorithm by using the new property, which enables us to reduce both time
and data complexities. We finally apply this technique to the Grain family, which is a
well-analyzed class of stream ciphers. There are three stream ciphers, Grain-128a, Grain-128,
and Grain-v1 in the Grain family, and Grain-v1 is in the eSTREAM portfolio and Grain-128a
is standardized by ISO/IEC. As a result we break them all, and especially for Grain-128a,
the cryptanalysis on its full version is reported for the first time.
3.10 Towards Quantitative Analysis of Cyber Security
Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute – Rehovot, IL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Adi Shamir
Joint work of Achiya Bar-On, Itai Dinur, Orr Dunkelman, Rani Hod, Nathan Keller, Eyal Ronen, Adi Shamir
Cyber security is a hot research area, but almost all the discussion about it is qualitative
rather than quantitative. In this talk we consider the specific subtopic of backup schemes
designed to protect computer systems against ransomware and cyber attacks. We develop a
precise model with a concrete cost function, which describes the problem as an online/oﬄine
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optimization problem whose solution can be described by a pebbling game. We provide
optimal backup schemes for all the cases with up to 10 backup devices, and find matching
upper and lower bounds on the asymptotic efficiency of optimal backup schemes with an
arbitrarily large number of backup devices.
3.11 Security of Caesar Candidates against (beyond) Birthday and/or
Nonce-Reusing Attacks
Damian Vizár (EPFL – Lausanne, CH)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Damian Vizár
Joint work of Serge Vaudenay, Damian Vizár
Main reference Serge Vaudenay, Damian Vizár: “Under Pressure: Security of Caesar Candidates beyond their
Guarantees”, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2017, p. 1147, 2017.
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1147
The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness
(CAESAR) has as its official goal to “identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer
advantages over [the Galois-Counter Mode with AES]” and are suitable for widespread
adoption.” Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round
of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.a. whether or not it can tolerate nonce
misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These
claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates.
Interpreting “Robustness” in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage when security
guarantees are void, we describe attacks with 64-bit complexity or beyond, and/or with
nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then classify the candidates depending on how
powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks,
or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our
results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver,
which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions.
3.12 Key-Recovery Attacks on Full Kravatte
Henri Gilbert (ANSSI – Paris, FR)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Henri Gilbert
Joint work of Colin Chaigneau, Thomas Fuhr, Henri Gilbert, Jian Guo, Jérémy Jean, Jean-René Reinhard, Ling
Song
Main reference Colin Chaigneau, Thomas Fuhr, Henri Gilbert, Jian Guo, Jérémy Jean, Jean-René Reinhard, Ling
Song: “Key-Recovery Attacks on Full Kravatte”, IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol., Vol. 2018(1),
pp. 5–28, 2018.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2018.i1.5-28
We present a cryptanalysis of the July 2017 version of the full Kravatte and of a strengthened
version presented in November at ECC 2017. Kravatte is an instantiation of the Farfalle
construction of a pseudorandom function (PRF) with variable input and output length. This
construction, proposed by Bertoni et al., represents an efficiently parallelizable and extremely
versatile building block for the design of symmetric mechanisms, e.g. message authentication
codes or stream ciphers. It relies on a set of non-linear permutations and on so-called rolling
functions and can be split into a compression layer followed by a two-step expansion layer.
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Kravatte instantiates Farfalle using linear rolling functions and non-linear permutations
obtained by iterating the Keccak round function.
We develop several key recovery attacks against this PRF, based on three different attack
strategies that bypass part of the construction and target a reduced number of permutation
rounds. A higher order differential attack exploits the possibility to build an affine space
of values in the cipher state after the compression layer. An algebraic meet-in-the-middle
attack can be mounted on the second step of the expansion layer. Finally, a linear recurrence
distinguisher can be found on intermediate states of the second step of the expansion layer
and leveraged to mount a third attack. All the attacks rely on the ability to invert a small
number of the final rounds of the construction. In particular, the last two rounds of the
construction together with the final masking by the key can be algebraically inverted, which
allows to recover the key. The complexities of the attacks are far below the claimed security
level. Following the communication of the above cryptanalyses to the designers, a tweaked
version of Kravatte was released in December 2017, in which one of the linear rolling functions
is replaced by a non-linear rolling function.
3.13 Clustering Related-Tweak Characteristics
Maria Eichlseder (TU Graz, AT)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Maria Eichlseder
Joint work of Maria Eichlseder, Daniel Kales
The TWEAKEY/STK construction is an increasingly popular approach for designing
tweakable block ciphers that notably uses a linear tweakey schedule. Several recent attacks
have analyzed the implications of this approach for differential cryptanalysis and other
attacks that can take advantage of related tweakeys. We generalize the clustering approach
of a recent differential attack on the tweakable block cipher MANTIS-5 and describe
a tool for efficiently finding and evaluating such clusters. More specifically, we consider
the set of all differential characteristics compatible with a given truncated characteristic,
tweak difference, and optional constraints for the differential. We refer to this set as a
semi-truncated characteristic and estimate its probability by analyzing the distribution of
compatible differences at each step.
We apply this approach to find a semi-truncated differential characteristic for MANTIS-6
with probability about 2−68 and derive a key-recovery attack with a complexity of about 255
chosen-plaintext queries and computations. The data-time product is about 2110  2126.
3.14 Conditional Linear Cryptanalysis
Stav Perle (Technion – Haifa, IL) and Eli Biham (Technion – Haifa, IL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Stav Perle and Eli Biham
In this talk we introduce an extension of linear cryptanalysis that may reduce the complexity
of attacks by conditioning linear approximations on other linear approximations. We show
that the bias of some linear approximations may increase under such conditions, so that after
discarding the known plaintexts that do not satisfy the conditions, the bias of the remaining
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known plaintexts increases. We show that this extension can lead to improvements of attacks,
which may require fewer known plaintexts in total. By a careful application of our extension
to Matsui’s attack on the full 16-round DES we succeed to reduce the complexity of the best
attack on DES to less than 242.
3.15 Linear Cryptanalysis Using Low-Bias Approximations
Tomer Ashur (KU Leuven, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Tomer Ashur
Joint work of Tomer Ashur, Daniël Bodden, Orr Dunkelman
Main reference Tomer Ashur, Daniël Bodden, Orr Dunkelman: “Linear Cryptanalysis Using Low-bias Linear
Approximations”, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2017, p. 204, 2017.
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/204
This work deals with linear approximations having absolute bias smaller than 2−n/2 which
were previously believed to be unusable for a linear attack. We show how a series of
observations which are individually not statistically significant can be used to create a χ2
distinguisher. This is different from previous works which combined a series of significant
observations to reduce the data complexity of a linear attack.
3.16 Multidimensional, Affine and Conditional Linear Cryptanalysis
Kaisa Nyberg (Aalto University, FI)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Kaisa Nyberg
Recently, new variants of linear cryptanalysis have been proposed. In this talk we focus
on the affine multidimensional cryptanalysis and the conditional linear cryptanalysis. The
affine method is based on multidimensional linear cryptanalysis and offers the option of
discarding a whole half-space of linear approximations that do not contribute to statistical
nonrandomness to keep only the information extracted from an affine subspace of linear
approximatons. The conditional linear cryptanalysis was invented by Biham and Perle. In
this talk we compare these methods and explain there relationships in the light of a small
practical example originating from the DES cipher.
Introduction
Linear cryptanalysis is a statistical method used for distinguishing a block cipher from a
random family of permutations and can be extended to key recovery attacks in practical
ciphers. It makes use of nonrandom behavior of linear approximations, which are single-bit
values obtained by exclusive-or summation of certain input bits and output bits of the block
cipher, or some rounds of it, over a large number of plaintexts.
Correlations of linear approximations over a block cipher with a fixed key are typically
not statistically independent when taken as random variables over the data space. Methods
that explicitly measure such dependencies, and use them in statistical analysis, have been
presented previously by Murphy in [5] and very recently by Biham and Perle [1]. On
the other hand, the main motivation of multidimensional linear cryptanalysis is that the
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dependencies of linear approximations need not be measured explicitly as they are captured
by the multidimensional linear test statistic. In this paper, we will present a concrete example
to illustrate how this works in practice.
Next we briefly recall the multidimensional linear method, the affine space method, and
the conditional linear cryptanalysis, and illustrate them for an example presented by Biham
and Perle.
Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
In the context of linear cryptanalysis, a linear approximation of a transformation F from Fn2
to Fm2 is a Boolean function in Fn2 defined by two vectors a,∈ Fn2 and b ∈ Fn2 as follows
x 7→ a · x+ b · F (x).
In the statistical setting, a linear approximation is considered as a binary random variable
X over the given space of transformations with a probability density function defined by
Pr(X = 0) = 2−n#{x ∈ Fn2 | a · x+ b · F (x) = 0}.
So we can write X = a · x+ b · F (x). In the linear-algebraic setting, a linear approximation
a · x + b · F (x) is identified with the vector (a, b), called a mask pair, in the linear space
Fn2 × Fm2 over F2.
Each linear approximation of F (x) is a Boolean function and induces a probability
distribution on {0, 1}. Its bias ε(a,b) is given by
ε(a,b) = Pr(a · x+ b · F (x) = 0)− 1/2
and its correlation c(a,b) by
c(a,b) = 2ε(a,b) = Pr(a · x+ b · F (x) = 0)− Pr(a · x+ b · F (x) = 1).
Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis considers a number of linear approximations that
form a linear subspace V in Fn2 × Fm2 . Let t be the dimension of this subspace. Then a
multidimensional linear approximation is a vector-valued Boolean function from Fn2 to Ft2.
The components of this vector-valued function are in one-to-one correspondence with the
mask pairs (a, b) ∈ V .
The strength of a multidimensional linear approximation is measured by its capacity CV
given as follows
CV =
∑
(a,b)∈V,(a,b)6=0
c2(a,b).
The multidimensional distinguisher is defined by the following test statistic
T (D) = N
∑
(a,b)∈V,(a,b)6=0
cˆ(a,b)(D)2, where
D = is a sample of N plaintexts x,
cˆ(a,b)(D) = N−1 (#{x ∈ D | a · x+ b · F (x) = 0} −#{x ∈ D | a · x+ b · F (x) = 1}) .
Under the assumption that the data for the observed correlations are computed from N
independently and randomly drawn x, the test statistic T (D) is a Pearson’s chi square test
statistic with 2t − 1 degrees of freedom. For large N and for uniformly distributed data,
T (D) follows a central chi square distribution. In the case, where the sample is drawn from a
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nonuniform distribution, it was argued in [4] based on [3] that T (D) follows a noncentral chi
square distribution with noncentrality parameter NCV , where CV is the nonzero capacity of
the multidimensional linear approximation applied to cipher.
Let us now present an example of a typical situation where the subspace V contains
many useless linear approximations. Suppose that a multidimensional linear approximation
of a cipher is built around a set of mask pairs (a, b), where a is a fixed nonzero mask on
the plaintext and the ciphertext masks b vary within a linear subspace B. The least linear
subspace to contain all such masks is {0, a} ×B. Then the correlations of the linear masks
of the form (0, b), b ∈ B have correlation zero, and do not add to the capacity of the
multidimensional linear approximation, but just make the linear approximation space larger.
Clearly,
{a, 0} ×B = ({a} ×B) ∪ ({0} ×B) .
The affine subspace method to be presented next allows to discard the useless linear approx-
imations in {0} ×B and exploit the useful ones in the affine subspace {a} ×B.
Affine Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Given a multidimensional linear approximation as described in the previous section, we split
V into two halves, a subspace U of dimension s = t− 1 and the affine subspace V \U . Given
(a1, b1) ∈ V \U , all the mask pairs in V can be written in the form (a2, b2) or (a1+a2, b1+b2),
where (a2, b2) ∈ U .
First, Let us apply the multidimensional linear model to the sapce V . Then the test
statistic TV (D) is computed as follows
TV (D) = N
∑
(a,b)∈V
cˆ(a,b)(D)2.
Secondly, let us apply the multidimensional model to the linear approximations in the
subspace U to obtain whence the test statistic is computed as
TU (D) = N
∑
(a2,b2)∈U
cˆ(a2,b2)(D)2.
We now define the affine test statistic Taff(D) as follows
Taff(D) = TV (D)− TU (D) = N
∑
(a2,b2)∈U
cˆ(a1+a2,b1+b2)(D)2.
Under the assumption that the data for the observed correlations are computed from N
independently and randomly drawn x, we obtain using Pearson’s chi square test that Taff(D)
is chi square distributed with 2s degrees of freedom, for large N . In the random case, we
then have a central chi square distribution with mean 2s and variance 2s+1. Otherwise, the
mean can be computed from the expression Taff(D) = TV (D)− TU (D) to get
ExpTaff(D) = 2s +N(CV − CU ).
Thus the noncentrality parameter of the chi square distribution of Taff(D) in the cipher case
is equal to CV − CU , and we obtain
VarTaff(D) = 2 (2s + 2N(CV − CU )) .
Similarly as for multidimensional linear cryptanalysis, the derived affine statistical model can
be used in cryptanalytic distinguishing and key-recovery attacks. Next we present a second
example which shows that the affine space method can improve upon the multidimensional
linear cryptanalysis.
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Example of Biham and Perle
Recently, Eli Biham and Stav Perle proposed a new cryptanalysis method called as conditional
linear cryptanalysis [1]. It applies to the case where two linear approximations are mutually
dependent. For example, they found two dependent linear approximations in DES. We denote
the random variables related to them by X and Y . They have the following probability
density functions
Pr(X = 0) = 12 + ε Pr(X = 1) =
1
2 − ε
Pr(Y = 0) = 12 Pr(Y = 1) =
1
2 .
Their dependency is given in terms of conditional probabilities
Pr(X = 0|Y = 0) = 12 + 2ε, Pr(X = 0|Y = 1) =
1
2 ,
Pr(X = 1|Y = 0) = 12 − 2ε, Pr(X = 1|Y = 1) =
1
2 .
We use this example to illustrate the behavior of the three variants of linear cryptanalysis.
The multidimensional linear model. The capacity of the 2-dimensional multidimensional
linear approximation in V spanned by the linear approximations X and Y is equal to
CV = c2X + c2Y + c2X+Y .
Note that we use the variable symbol instead of the mask pairs to identify the non-zero linear
approximations. It is easy to check that the linear approximation X + Y has the same bias
as X, and the bias of Y is equal to zero. We get CV = 8ε2. Then the multidimensional test
statistic
TV = N
(
cˆX(D)2 + cˆY (D)2 + cˆX+Y (D)2
)
has a noncentral chi square distribution with 3 degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
equal to 8Nε2.
The affine linear model. Since cY = 0, it does not contribute to the capacity of the
multidimensional distribution. To discard it, we apply the affine linear model with the
1-dimensional subspace U = {0, Y }. Then the affine test statistic
Taff = N
(
cˆX(D)2 + cˆX+Y (D)2
)
has chi square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
N(CV − CU ) = N
(
c2X + c2X+Y
)
= 8Nε2.
It means that the affine linear test has the same noncentrality parameter but less degrees of
freedom than the multidimensional linear test and hence is more efficient.
The conditional linear model. Recently, Biham and Perle proposed conditional linear
cryptanalysis to exploit high conditional correlations [1]. The idea is to use the analogical
statistical model as for classical linear cryptanalysis in the context of conditional probabilities
and biases by discarding the data that does not satisfy the condition. According to this model
the observed number of data Nˆ ′ that satisfy X = 0 within a sample of N ′ plaintext-ciphertext
pairs that satisfy Y = 0 is binomially distributed with probability Pr(X = 0 |Y = 0) =
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1/2+2ε and sample size N ′. The bias of this conditional distribution is 2ε and the correlation
is 4ε. Hence the distribution of the observed correlation
2Nˆ ′/N ′ − 1
can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean cX|Y=0 = 4ε and variance 1/N ′,
where we denoted by
cX|Y=0 = Pr(X = 0 |Y = 0)− Pr(X = 1 |Y = 0)
the conditional correlation.
The data complexity estimate obtained from the normal distribution is the same that can
be obtain using the chi square distribution obtained from the squared observed correlation [2].
More precisely, the conditional test statistic Tcond defined as
Tcond = N ′(2Nˆ ′/N ′ − 1)2 ∼ χ21(δ)
where
δ = N ′c2X|Y=0 = 16N ′ε2
gives the same data complexity estimate as the binomial (normal) test statistic Nˆ ′/N ′
traditionally used in linear cryptanalysis. Since Y is unbiased, it is estimated that for the
total size N of the sample is equal to 2N ′.
We can see that the non-centrality parameter δ is the same also in the case of conditional
linear cryptanalysis. To explain this coincidence, we need to express the capacity of the
affine linear approximation in terms of the probabilities p00, p01, p10, and p11, where
puv = Pr(X = u, Y = v), u = 0, 1 and v = 0, 1
are the probabilities of the 2-dimensional variable (X,Y ). Then it can be shown that
CV − CU = c2X + c2X+Y = 2
(
(p00 − p10)2 + (p01 − p11)2
)
Now we observe that p01− p11 = 0. It means that all the nonbalancedness of the distribution
of this pair (X,Y ) of linear approximations can measured by the first term
p00 − p10 = Pr(Y = 0)(Pr(X = 0 |Y = 0)− Pr(X = 1 |Y = 0)) = Pr(Y = 0)cX|Y=0 ,
that is, by the product of Pr(Y = 0) and the conditional correlation cX|Y=0 .
Finally, we observe that the conditional approach allows to reduce the degree of freedom
to one while keeping the noncentrality parameter the same as in the usual multidimensional
cryptanalysis and in the affine multidimensional cryptanalysis. We conclude that from the
three statistical models considered for the given example, the conditional linear cryptanalysis
of Biham and Perle gives the most efficent statistical distinguisher.
Acknowledgements. I wish to thank Eli Biham for discussions related to conditional linear
cryptanalysis and Céline Blondeau for suggestions how to improve the presentation.
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3.17 The Chi-Squared Method
Stefano Tessaro (University of California – Santa Barbara, US)
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Proving tight bounds on information-theoretic indistinguishability is a central problem in
symmetric cryptography. In this talk, I introduce a new method for information-theoretic
indistinguishability proofs, called “the chi-squared method”. At its core, the method requires
upper-bounds on the so-called chi-squared divergence between the output distributions of
two systems being queried
I will showcase the chi-squared method by giving a simple proof of optimal security for
the XOR of two random permutations, which improves upon bounds previously shown with
much more involved machinery (e.g., mirror theory).
3.18 Some applications of the chi square method
Mridul Nandi (Indian Statistical Institute – Kolkata, IN)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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In this talk, I would like to discuss some possible applications of chi-squared method. So far,
it has been applied to the sum of random permutations, EDM and truncation of random
permutation. Very recently, it is also applied to prove the PRF security of sum of permutation
where the inputs are reused in a certain way. This is related the well known powerful tool
– mirror theory. As the proof of the Mirror theory is highly complex and contains several
non-trivial gap, it would be nice to explore other way out for the application of the mirror
theory. Chi-squared method could be such an alternative. I also describe how to prove a
weaker form of mirror theory using the chi-squared method result applied to the reused sum
of permutation. Using this, I would be able to prove the weak-PRF full n bit security of
EDM. This can be possibly extended to standard PRF security, but requires more closer
analysis.
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3.19 Beyond-Birthday-Bound Secure MACs
Yannick Seurin (ANSSI – Paris, FR)
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A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a fundamental symmetric primitive allowing two
entities sharing a secret key to verify that a received message originates from one of the two
parties and was not modified by an attacker. Most existing MACs are built from a block
cipher, e.g., CBC-MAC or OMAC, or from a cryptographic hash function, e.g., HMAC. In
general, MACs which are constructed from a block cipher are secure only up to the so-called
birthday bound with respect to the block size n of the block cipher: they become insecure
when ∼ 2n/2 (blocks of) messages have been treated. This might be problematic, especially
when relying on lightweight block ciphers with small block size or when updating the secret
key is impractical. In this talk, we survey recent results on MAC constructions based on a
block cipher or a tweakable block cipher which are secure beyond the birthday bound such as
EWCDM [1], ZMAC [2] and HaT/NaT/HaK/NaK [3] and we highlight some open problems
along the way.
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3.20 Recent Advancements in Sponge-Based MACs
Kan Yasuda (NTT - Tokyo, JP)
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No abstract given.
3.21 The collision-resistance of keyed hashing
Joan Daemen (Radboud University Nijmegen, NL, and STMicroelectronics – Diegem, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Joan Daemen
MAC functions and pseudorandom functions with arbitrary input length often consist of
two stages: a keyed hash function that compresses the input to a fixed-length accumulator
followed by a function that maps the accumulator to the output, that may also have variable
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length. The security requirement for the keyed hash is that it should be difficult for an
adversary that does not know the key to find inputs that collide in the accumulator. More
precisely, the adversary gets adaptive query access to the keyed hash function where she gets
the image of the accumulator through a random oracle. In other words, she can only see
whether inputs collide or not in the accumulator.
Keyed hash functions are implemented in a wide variety of ways: serial constructions
such as CBC-MAC, polynomial evaluations in a finite field and Pelican-MAC or parallel
constructions such as PMAC or Farfalle. These constructions make use of block ciphers,
tweakable block ciphers or permutations. Each of these have their own advantages and
disadvantages, but all are vulnerable to a generic collision attack that has success probability
M22−(b+1) with b the size of the accumulator and M the number of queries to the keyed
hash function (data complexity).
One usually characterizes the level of security that a cryptographic scheme offers by the so-
called security strength that is expressed in bits. For a certain attack, it is the binary logarithm
of its data complexity M minus that of its success probability p, so s = log2M − log2 p. For
the generic attacks, at one end of the spectrum is an attack with just a couple of queries
that has s ≈ b. At the other end the success probability approaches 1 when M ≈ 2b/2 and
hence it has s ≈ b/2. So the maximum achievable security strength decreases from b to b/2
bits as the attack complexity grows from 2 to 2b/2. This curve is called the birthday bound.
When designing a keyed hash function, different strategies may be followed. First, one
may aim either for a capacity claim or for a security strength claim.
In the former, one makes a claim for the function that there are no attacks with success
probability below M22−(c+1) with c some specified constant usually called the capacity.
In the so-called hermetic design strategy, one chooses b = c, implying that there are no
attacks better than the generic attack and hence that the used primitive has no exploitable
weaknesses. This usually requires using a primitive with a significant computational cost.
This cost can be reduced drastically by taking b > c, so by over-dimensioning the primitive.
An example of this strategy is Pelican-MAC, that has c = 120 and uses 4 unkeyed AES
rounds as permutation, so b = 128.
In a security strength claim one states that there are no attacks with success probability
below M2−s, possibly putting an upper bound on M . If this upper bound is 2a with a < s,
this requires taking b at least s+ a and 2s otherwise. An example is Kravatte with b = 1600
and s = 137.
Determining the best attack strategy for collision attacks for the different constructions
in combination with different primitives is an interesting research problem and allows gaining
insight in how to build the most efficient keyed hash function for some given set of target
platforms and for some target security, either expressed by a capacity c or a strength s.
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3.22 Challenges and Opportunities for the Standardization of
Threshold Cryptography
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Main reference Apostol Vassilev, Nicky Mouha, Luis Brandao: “Psst, Can You Keep a Secret?”, IEEE Computer,
Vol. 51(1), pp. 94–97, 2018.
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Cryptography lies at the heart of the protection of data at rest and in transit over the
Internet. The security of data afforded by the employed cryptographic primitives depends
not only on their theoretical properties but also on the robustness of their implementations
in software and hardware. Threshold cryptography introduces a computational paradigm
that enables a higher level of assurance for the implementations of cryptographic primitives.
We discuss challenges and opportunities related to the standardization of threshold
cryptography [1], and give some insights into their application to symmetric-key cryptography.
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3.23 Tools on Cryptanalysis
Stefan Kölbl (Technical University of Denmark – Lyngby, DK)
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The division property method is a powerful technique to determine integral distinguishers on
block ciphers. While the complexity of finding these distinguishers is higher, it has recently
been shown that MILP and SAT solvers can efficiently find such distinguishers.
In this work, we provide a framework to fully automate finding those distinguishers which
solely relies on a simple description of the cryptographic primitive. We demonstrate the ease
of use by finding integral distinguishers for more than 30 primitives based on different design
strategies and present several new or improved distinguishers for ChaCha, ChasKey, DES,
GIFT, LBlock, Mantis, Qarma, RoadRunner, Salsa and SM4.
3.24 A survey of recent results on AES permutations
Christian Rechberger (TU Graz, AT)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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We survey recent results on new properties of AES, and subspace trail cryptanalysis as a
way to describe it. This includes various properties of 5-round AES that hold for any secret
key, and a 10-round property that holds for a set of 232 chosen keys.
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3.25 Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round AES, Revisited
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Determining the security of AES is a central problem in cryptanalysis, but progress in
this area had been slow and only a handful of cryptanalytic techniques led to significant
advancements. At Eurocrypt 2017 Grassi et al. presented a novel type of distinguisher for
AES-like structures, but so far all the published attacks which were based on this distinguisher
were either inferior or comparable to previously known attacks in their complexity. In this
paper we combine the technique of Grassi et al. with several other techniques to obtain the
best known key recovery attack on 5-round AES in the single-key model, reducing its data,
memory and time complexities from about 232 to about 222.5. Extending our techniques
to 7-round AES, we obtain the best known attacks which use practical amounts of data
and memory, breaking the record for such attacks which was obtained 18 years ago by the
classical Square attack.
3.26 Integral Attacks on AES
Meiqin Wang (Shandong University – Jinan, CN)
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Reduced-round version of AES has been a popular underlying primitives to design new
cryptographic schemes. The security including the distinguishing property of AES deserves
to study more. Recently, the key-dependent integral and impossible differential distinguishers
for 5-round AES have been put forward. Later, the structural distinguisher and Yoyo
distinguisher for 5-round or 6-round AES have been introduced. Although the complexities
of the key-dependent integral and impossible differential distinguishers are much higher
than those of the structural or Yoyo distinguisher for 5-round AES, more detailed property
for MixColumn can be identified by them. Traditional impossible differential and integral
distinguishers for 4-round AES have approximately equal data complexity. However, for the
recent proposed key-dependent distinguishers, there is a big gap between the complexities
of the integral and impossible differential distinguishers. Even with the same property of
MixColumn, the integral distinguisher requires the whole codebook while the impossible
distinguisher just needs 298.2 chosen plaintexts. Moreover, the complexities of traditional
impossible differential or integral distinguishers are identical for the chosen-plaintext and
chosen-ciphertext settings, but they are very different for the key-dependent distinguishers.
Till now, the 5-round integral and impossible differential distinguishers can only work for
chosen-ciphertext and chosen plaintext settings, respectively.
In this talk, by appending the condition for the output values for 5-round zero-correlation
linear hull, we can transform such zero-correlation linear hull to a new key-dependent integral
distinguisher for 5-round AES with 296 chosen plaintexts which is much better than the
previous integral distinguisher at CRYPTO 2015 with the whole codebook. Secondly, we
focus on transforming the key-dependent impossible differential distinguishers from the
chosen-plaintext to chosen-ciphertext situation by setting the condition on the output values.
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We found that the key-dependent integral distinguishers have very different complexities
but the key-dependent impossible differential distinguishers have no significant difference for
the complexity under different attacking modes. Finally, we utilize our proposed 5-round
integral distinguisher to recover the key for 6-round AES. Although the key recovery attack
is no better than the previous attacks with 4-round distinguishers, it is the first integral
key-recovery attack on 6-round based on 5-round distinguisher.
3.27 On Sboxes sharing the same DDT
Anne Canteaut (INRIA – Paris, FR)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Anne Canteaut
Joint work of Christina Boura, Anne Canteaut, Jérémy Jean, Valentin Suder
In this work, we discuss two notions of differential equivalence on Sboxes. First, we introduce
the notion of DDT-equivalence which applies to vectorial Boolean functions that share the
same difference distribution table (DDT). It is worth noticing that this property equivalently
means that the two functions share the same squared Walsh transform. Next, we compare
this notion to what we call the γ-equivalence, applying to vectorial Boolean functions whose
DDTs have the same support. This second property has been studied by Gorodilova for
quadratic APN functions and in particular for the Gold family of functions. We discuss the
relation between these two equivalence notions, demonstrate that the number of DDT- or
γ-equivalent functions is invariant under EA- and CCZ-equivalence. This answers an open
problem raised by Gorodilova. In parallel, we also provide an algorithm for computing the
DDT-equivalence and the γ-equivalence classes of a given function. We study the sizes of
these classes for some families of Sboxes.
3.28 Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) for Boomerang Attacks
Yu Sasaki (NTT – Tokyo, JP)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Yu Sasaki
Joint work of Carlos Cid, Tao Huang, Thomas Peyrin, Ling Song
A boomerang attack is a cryptanalysis framework that regards a block cipher E as the
composition of two sub-ciphers E1 ◦ E0 and builds a particular characteristic for E with
probability p2q2 by combining differential characteristics for E0 and E1 with probability p
and q, respectively. Crucially the validity of this figure is under the assumption that the
characteristics for E0 and E1 can be chosen independently. Indeed, Murphy has shown
that independently chosen characteristics may turn out to be incompatible. On the other
hand, several researchers observed that the probability can be improved to p or q around the
boundary between E0 and E1 by considering a positive dependency of the two characteristics,
e.g. the ladder switch and S-box switch by Biryukov and Khovratovich. This phenomenon
was later formalised by Dunkelman et al. as a sandwich attack that regards E as E1 ◦Em ◦E0,
where Em satisfies some differential propagation among four texts with probability r, and
the entire probability is p2q2r. In this paper, we revisit the issue of dependency of two
characteristics in Em, and propose a new tool called Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT),
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which evaluates r in a systematic and easy-to-understand way when Em is composed of
a single S-box layer. With the BCT, previous observations on the S-box including the
incompatibility, the ladder switch and the S-box switch are represented in a unified manner.
Moreover, the BCT can detect a new switching effect, which shows that the probability
around the boundary may be even higher than p or q.
3.29 QCCA on Feistel
Tetsu Iwata (Nagoya University, JP)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Tetsu Iwata
Joint work of Gembu Ito, Tetsu Iwata, Ryutaroh Matsumoto
Kuwakado and Morii considered quantum chosen plaintext attacks and showed an efficient
distinguishing attack against the three-round Feistel cipher by using Simon’s period finding
algorithm [1]. In this talk, we consider quantum chosen ciphertext attacks, and present an
efficient distinguishing attack against the four-round Feistel cipher.
References
1 Hidenori Kuwakado and Masakatu Morii. Quantum distinguisher between the 3-round
Feistel cipher and the random permutation. ISIT 2010, pp. 2682–2685, IEEE, 2010.
3.30 Some Feistel structures with low degree round functions
Arnab Roy (University of Bristol, GB)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
© Arnab Roy
We consider several generalized Feistel constructions with low-degree round function. In
particular, we study cases of the form x→ xr for various r, with focus on the simplest case
r = 3. Our analysis allows us to propose more efficient generalizations of the MiMC design
(Asiacrypt’16). We evaluate the new designs in three application areas. Whereas MiMC was
not competitive at all in a recently proposed new class of PQ-secure signature scheme, our
new construction leads to about 30 times smaller signatures than MiMC. For MPC use cases,
where MiMC seems to outperform all other competitors to start with, we observe substantial
improvements in throughput by a factor of around 5 and simultaneously a 10-fold reduction
of pre-processing effort, at the cost of a higher latency. Another use case where MiMC
already outperforms other designs, in the area of SNARKs, only sees modest improvements.
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3.31 Generalized Feistel Networks with Optimal Diffusion
Léo Paul Perrin (INRIA – Paris, FR)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference Léo Perrin, Angela Promitzer, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger: “Improvements to the
Linear Layer of LowMC: A Faster Picnic”, IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2017, p. 1148,
2017.
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1148
Generalized Feistel networks are a common block cipher structure. In [2], Suzaki and
Minematsu introduced an improved branch permutation which allowed a faster diffusion in
generalized Feistel networks. While such structures usually need b rounds to achieve full
diffusion over b branches, Suzaki and Minematsu’s requires only about 2 log2(b).
In this talk, we presented a different method for building generalized Feistel networks
with fast diffusion. The round function is simple: it can be seen as a simple two-branched
Feistel network where the Feistel function consists in an S-Box layer followed by a rotation of
the corresponding words. The core idea consists in using different rotation amounts in each
round. Indeed, if those are chosen carefully then we can prove a fast diffusion. For example,
if the rotation sequence is {0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 8, 0, ...}, then diffusion is essentially as fast as
in [2]. Furthermore, if the sequence is instead the Fibonacci sequence {0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, ...},
then diffusion is even faster and reaches an optimal bound first identified by Suzaki and
Minematsu. The latter construction was used in [1] to build linear layers with full diffusion
allowing a constant time implementation with a speed comparable to a table-based one.
References
1 Léo Perrin, Angela Promitzer, Sebastian Ramacher, and Christian Rechberger. Improve-
ments to the Linear Layer of LowMC: A Faster Picnic. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2017/1148, 2017.
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3.32 An Improved Affine Equivalence Algorithm
Itai Dinur (Ben Gurion University – Beer Sheva, IL)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference Itai Dinur: “An Improved Affine Equivalence Algorithm for Random Permutations”, IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Vol. 2018, p. 115, 2018.
URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/115
In this work we study the affine equivalence problem, where given two functions ~F , ~G :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, the goal is to determine whether there exist invertible affine transformations
A1, A2 over GF (2)n such that ~G = A2 ◦ ~F ◦ A1. Algorithms for this problem have several
well-known applications in the design and analysis of Sboxes, cryptanalysis of white-box
ciphers and breaking a generalized Even-Mansour scheme.
We describe a new algorithm for the affine equivalence problem and focus on the variant
where ~F , ~G are permutations over n-bit words, as it has the widest applicability. The
complexity of our algorithm is about n32n bit operations with very high probability whenever
~F (or ~G) is a random permutation. This improves upon the best known algorithms for this
problem (published by Biryukov et al. at EUROCRYPT 2003), where the first algorithm has
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time complexity of n322n and the second has time complexity of about n323n/2 and roughly
the same memory complexity.
Our algorithm is based on a new structure (called a rank table) which is used to analyze
particular algebraic properties of a function that remain invariant under invertible affine
transformations. Besides its standard application in our new algorithm, the rank table is of
independent interest and we discuss several of its additional potential applications.
3.33 Invariant Attacks and (Non-)linear Approximations
Christof Beierle
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Joint work of Christof Beierle, Anne Canteaut, Gregor Leander
This work discusses nonlinear approximations for block cipher cryptanalysis by embedding it
into the better-understood framework of linear cryptanalysis.
In the first part we show that, in some cases, a deterministic nonlinear approximation
(aka. nonlinear invariant attack) over a keyed instance of a cipher implies the existence of
a (non-trivial) highly-biased linear approximation over the same instance. In the second
part, we present a framework for studying non-deterministic nonlinear approximations. In
particular, by transforming the cipher under consideration by conjugating each keyed instance
with a fixed permutation, we are able to transfer many methods from linear cryptanalysis to
the nonlinear case. Using this framework we in particular show that there exist ciphers for
which some transformed versions are significantly weaker with respect to linear cryptanalysis
than their original counterparts. This suggests that the basic security argument of counting
the minimum number of active S-boxes may not be sufficient to avoid such kind of attacks.
3.34 Recent results on reduced versions of Ketje
Maria Naya-Plasencia (INRIA – Paris, FR)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference Thomas Fuhr, María Naya-Plasencia, Yann Rotella: “State-Recovery Attacks on Modified Ketje
Jr”, IACR Trans. Symmetric Cryptol., Vol. 2018(1), pp. 29–56, 2018.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2018.i1.29-56
In this article we study the security of the authenticated encryption algorithm Ketje against
divide-and-conquer attacks. Ketje is a third-round candidate in the ongoing CAESAR
competition, which shares most of its design principles with the SHA-3 hash function. Several
versions of Ketje have been submitted, with different sizes for its internal state. We describe
several state-recovery attacks on the smaller variant, called Ketje Jr. We show that if one
increases the amount of keystream output after each round from 16 bits to 40 bits, Ketje
Jr becomes vulnerable to divide-and-conquer attacks with time complexities 271.5 for the
original version and 282.3 for the current tweaked version, both with a key of 96 bits. We
also propose a similar attack when considering rates of 32 bits for the non-tweaked version.
Our findings do not threaten the security of Ketje, but should be taken as a warning against
potential future modifications that would aim at increasing the performance of the algorithm.
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3.35 On the security of LINE messaging application
Kazuhiko Minematsu
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In this talk, we study the security of LINE messaging application (a.k.a. text messaging or
instant messaging). LINE is by far the common messaging application in Japan, and is also
popular in some East Asian countries, such as Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia. There are
217 million monthly active users, as of Jan. 2017.
LINE provides an End-to-End (E2E) encryption scheme called Letter Sealing since 2015.
After the reverse engineering work on Letter Sealing by Curtiss [1], LINE corporation has
published a whitepaper [3] describing the specification of Letter Sealing in 2016. Recently,
Espinoza et. al [2] proposed a replay attack against Letter Sealing.
We investigated this whitepaper, and found several vulnerabilities not covered by prior
work. With these vulnerabilities, we found practical attacks against LINE’s one-to-one
messaging and group messaging. The vulnerabilities are listed as follows.
The key and IV for symmetric-key encryption are derived from a group-shared key Kg
and senders public information
In the one-to-one key exchange phase, after individually computing “Shared Secret” at
both sides, there is no key confirmation.
In the symmetric-key encryption, the sender key ID and recipient key ID are not authen-
ticated.
Some of our attacks are possible with the help of malicious messaging server (E2E adversary).
We remark that many messaging application have equipped with an E2E encryption scheme,
and the main purpose is to provide a protection against E2E adversary. In addition, we found
some attacks that even do not need the help of E2E adversary, which is a severe security
flaw.
We have informed our findings to LINE corporation in advance. LINE corporation has
confirmed the attacks are valid as long as E2E adversary is involved, while those w/o E2E
adversary seem to be thwarted with additional operations not described in the whitepaper,
which is hard for us to verify at this point.
References
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3.36 Multiplication Operated Encryption with Trojan Resilience
Virginie Lallemand (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
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François-Xavier Standaert
As most hardware design companies cannot afford having their own foundries, a common
strategy consists in outsourcing the production of integrated circuits to external factories.
If this solution allows to reduce the production costs, it brings up the problem of trust in
the third party. One of the most feared threats in this respect goes under the name of
hardware Trojan, defined as a malicious modification of the circuit design. Possible actions of
Trojans include moves as devastating as key exfiltration. In this talk, we present a new block
cipher construction designed especially to help addressing this problem: our proposal can be
implemented using (mostly) untrusted low-cost chips and provides robustness more efficiently
than by exploiting secret sharing and multi-party computation on a standard block cipher.
Our concrete proposal is called MOE, acronym for “Multiplication Operated Encryption”:
its round structure only consists in a modular multiplication and a multiplication with a
binary matrix. These two operations being linear (with respect to different groups), they
allow efficient secret sharing and a reduced hardware cost in comparison to previous solutions.
One of our main contribution is the analysis of the cryptographic properties of the modular
multiplication, an operation that was used back in the 90s (for the round structure of the
ciphers IDEA and MMB for instance) but that to the best of our knowledge was never
studied in detail.
3.37 Instantiating the Whitened Swap-Or-Not Construction
Nils Gregor Leander (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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We discussed how to instantiate the Whitened Swap-Or-Not Construction by S. Tessaro [1].
We first discussed some inherent limitations and restrictions before showing a first attempt
how the framework could be instantiated.
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3.38 Better proofs for rekeying
Daniel J. Bernstein (University of Illinois – Chicago, US)
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The current mess of proofs of the cascade (FOCS 1996 Bellare–Canetti–Krawczyk), NMAC
(Crypto 1996 Bellare–Canetti–Krawczyk), PRNGs (CCS 2005 Barak–Halevi), and NMAC
again (Crypto 2006 Bellare) can be replaced by one simple tight multi-user security proof.
4 Panel discussions
4.1 Discussion on Mass Surveillance and the Real-World Impact of the
Symmetric-Crypto Research Community
Joan Daemen (Radboud University Nijmegen, NL, and STMicroelectronics – Diegem, BE)
License Creative Commons BY 3.0 Unported license
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On Friday morning there was a group discussion open for all seminar participants on a
number of questions related to the real-world relevance of the symmetric crypto community
and its research. Here a short summary of the outcome of these discussions. We thank Maria
Eichlseder for input and taking notes during the discussion. The discussion centered around
three themes.
The first theme was education of the general public. All agreed that it is impossible to
protect our privacy and security without awareness. This is the case in general and applies
specifically to the deployment of cryptography. Whether we, the symmetric cryptographic
community, can actually have an impact here, is another thing. A good example is educating
the general public about privacy (see mass surveillance, social media, etc.). However, privacy
is a very subtle notion and even education on something much simpler as security has failed
(see, e.g., how public key cryptography is deployed, or password policies, how people use
passwords, etc.). Of course educating developers and policy makers would be easier maybe
as they are professionals where a certain level of competence can be expected. Many of us
are teaching at universities and there we can make a difference and hope our students will
end up in policy-making positions. As a second aspect, the question was raised on what the
main messages would be that we want to communicate. Or in other words, is there even a
consensus (possible) in the academic community? For example, should companies be allowed
to use private data in exchange for services (even after users have agreed to some terms of
use)?
The second theme was about the education of protocol designers and programmers. The
starting point was that there are many new standards being drafted even now and many
repeat the same mistakes over and over again. Often the cryptographic knowledge of people
in the standardization committees is very limited. There was discussion where different
opinions were expressed and little agreement was reached. What we did agree on is that
details of cryptosystems for public use should be made public, and be publicly analyzed.
In the past, even public specifications have not always been carefully reviewed. Here the
‘provably secure’ WPA2, that was recently very badly broken, serves as a good example. As
a possible reason for this miserable situation was given that there are ‘too many irrelevant
standards’. This raised the question: which are the relevant standards that the cryptographic
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community should focus on? The point was raised that NIST has usage data that could give
us some guidance in this. Another interesting follow-up to this that was raised is that all are
encouraged to contribute to updated versions of the Ecrypt CSA document Algorithms, Key
Size and Protocol Report.
The third theme was the problem that an activity that is very important for the public
and that requires specialized skills and great effort, that of building secure implementations,
gives little academic reward. Here it was noted that papers reporting on implementations
may be accepted at conferences such as FSE and there are also efforts to create sites with
pointers to crypto libraries and tools.
4.2 Discussion on Robustness of CAESAR Candidates
Damian Vizár (EPFL – Lausanne, CH)
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CAESAR (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robust-
ness) explicitly names “robustness” as one of the desirable properties that an AE scheme
should possess. The call for submissions mentions nonce-misuse resistance, and any candidate
may target “any additional security goals and robustness goals that the submitters wish to
point out”. However, no explicit minimal requirements concerning robustness were requested
from the CAESAR candidates.
It is not clear whether there is any minimal degree of robustness that any candidate should
posses, what kinds of robustness are relevant, and what importance should “robustness” play
in the selection of CAESAR finalists. The goal of this discussion is to collect the opinions
related to the role of robustness in CAESAR, and to attempt to find a consensus (or a
compromise) for the answers to these questions.
Summary of the Discussion
The initial questions of the discussion were the following:
1. What should be understood under “robustness” in the context of CAESAR?
2. Should there by a degree of “robustness” that is absolutely required from all candidates?
(I.e. should there be any hard filtering based on “robustness”?)
3. If “robustness” is required, which particular properties is required, and what degree of
resilience is required?
Even though the discussion did not converge to a clear answer to any of the three questions,
it did generate a limited number of potential answers to these questions and further useful
comments.
On robustness itself. As it was pointed out, the term “robustness” is not robust itself. We
can mostly agree that informally, robustness means resilience against the improper use of a
scheme (or more generally, as Barwell et al. put it “Robustness characterises the ability of a
construct to be pushed right to the edge of its intended use case (and possibly beyond)”).
Identifying a satisfyingly exact definition in the context of CAESAR seems difficult. These
were the comments related to robustness:
No scheme can be universally robust. There will always be misuse cases that trivially
break any scheme (e.g. leaking the secret key in a silly way).
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Currently, robustness is evaluated through formal frameworks (MRAE, OAE, RAE and
RUP in CAESAR) which each capture a very precise level of resilience against one or
more specific types of misuse.
Schemes either claim security in the sense of one of these notions, or they give no
guarantees and no information on what happens in case of the related misuse. This
could thus be labelled explicit robustness.
Another possible definition of robustness is that a robust scheme mitigates the damage
done by a powerful attack that is outside of its security guarantees. E.g. a nonce based
AEAD scheme that only suffers from a non-reusable decryption attack under nonce misuse
is more robust (w.r.t. nonce misuse) than one that allows a low-complexity key recovery
in the same setting. As this exact level of (in)security is not always advertised by the
authors, this could be labelled e.g. implicit robustness.
For schemes that make the same claims w.r.t. to explicit robustness, the actual level
of (in)security against a strong attack may differ greatly.
Everyone agrees that side channel resistance is highly desirable. Everyone also agrees
that, because side channel protection is platform and implementation-specific, it is best
not to include it in this already complicated discussion.
It was agreed that the ease of protection against side channel attacks should not be
mandatory for all candidates, but should be seen as a strong advantage.
Rendering side channel information useless by measures on the protocol level was
proposed as a potential research avenue (e.g. using two independent authentication
keys to verify firmware updates).
Required level of robustness. Especially in this point, no consensus could be reached.
However, three general opinions recurred in the discussion:
The selection of the finalists should be conservative; the final portfolio should
not contain schemes that suffer from devastating attacks, even though these
may be outside of their guarantees. E.g. exclude schemes that allow low-complexity
recovery of the secret key or a secret state under nonce misuse. These were the arguments
in favour of this opinion:
We have to assume that the users of CAESAR recommendations will be inexperienced.
They may not understand or may ignore the usage conditions of the finalists. “The
good engineers will not need the portfolio.”
There are bound to be cases of misuse, and we should try to mitigate the damage, at
least for those kinds of misuse that we understand.
There are bound to be cases of (nonce) misuse, in which the devastating attacks may
undermine the credibility of the symmetric cryptography. This will be the opposite
effect of what CAESAR aims for.
The current pool of candidates contain schemes that do not suffer from devastating
attacks, why not take those?
There should be no default level of robustness required from the candidates.
We should not eliminate candidates based on a default robustness criterion.
These were the arguments in favour of this opinion:
It is enough that the finalists come with simple labels that clearly state what must
and what must not be done to preserve security. It is the responsibility of the users to
follow the (simple) instructions.
There are simple ways of making sure that the relevant misuse never occurs (e.g.
device-specific prefixes in nonces).
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This was not demanded at the beginning, or during the competition. We should not
introduce improvements over AES-GCM’s robustness now.
We already have the use cases to take care of this. In particular, this is not the primary
concern in the “high-performance applications” use case.
We cannot thwart every kind of misuse (e.g. using key as a random IV), thus we
should not make particular forms of robustness compulsory.
Something in between. There were two major proposals of the in-between kind:
No default robustness requirement. Take into account the cryptanalysis,
consider each case individually. Use the cryptanalysis to break ties. The
idea of using the results on exact (in)security of CAESAR candidates for breaking
ties between similar schemes in the final decision process seemed to be generally well
accepted.
No default robustness requirement. When issuing final portfolio, give 2
kinds of labels to all finalists: (1) “regular schemes” and (2) “experts-only
schemes” (or “brittle schemes”). The regular schemes would be those with no
devastating low complexity nonce reuse attacks or nonce respecting birthday attacks.
These would be recommended for a common user. The expert-only schemes would get
a warning of dire consequences in case of misuse and their brittleness.
The most desirable forms of robustness. This point was not addressed in much detail,
as the discussion focused mostly on the issue of having or not having default robustness
requirement. However, most of the examples, counter examples and comments worked with
nonce reuse.
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